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Introduction
Nigeria’s model of fiscal federalism represents a fundamental legal and institutional 
framework for policymaking in the country. As in other federations, it  defines the core 
rules  for  resource  allocation,  distribution  of  responsibilities  for  service  delivery,  and 
mechanisms for interaction between different tiers of government.
Nigeria’s  fiscal  federalism  arrangements  are  currently  attracting  increasing 
attention from both policymakers and analysts. This is a reflection of the fact that longer 
term perspectives of economic policy reform in the country are critically dependent upon 
improvements in the organization of inter-governmental arrangements. Such arrangements 
have  direct  implications  for  achieving  national  growth  and  poverty  reduction  targets. 
Simply put, there is a major need to strengthen the incentives of government agencies at all 
levels of authority to improve cooperation in designing of their policies and delivery of 
services.  At the same time, capacity will  have to be built  to support  such future inter-
governmental cooperation.
The need for stronger cooperation and other reforms in federalism is driven by 
several factors such as the following:
a) According to the Nigerian constitution, main public sector responsibilities are 
split across various government levels. Thus, no sole government could deliver 
radical  improvements  in  service  delivery  on  its  own,  which  means  that 
coordination  and  cooperation are  pre-requisites.  However,  the  existing 
mechanisms  and  institutions  for  inter-governmental  policy  coordination  are 
weak and need strengthening.
b) Significant fiscal decentralization of the public finance system have taken place 
since 1999. Given the existing resource allocation rules, such decentralization 
poses the risk of emphasizing – rather than taming - fiscal inequalities across 
the  states.  But  the  extent  and  trends  in  horizontal  inequality  remains 
undocumented, and no mitigation mechanism has been proposed as yet.
c) Reforms undertaken in Nigeria since 2003 appear to have been more profound 
at the federal level than in the states. The benefits of drastic improvements in 
macroeconomic  policies  and fiscal  discipline  at  the Federal  Government  of 
Nigeria (FGN) level are severely constrained by lagging reforms in the states. 
The FGN is actively exploring options for setting up - within its existing legal 
and institutional  remits  -  new mechanisms to encourage  states to accelerate 
reforms and to improve intergovernmental  coordination in key service areas 
under joint responsibility.
d) The reform of  federal  arrangements  is  politically  sensitive.  Reforms  of  the 
Federal system are likely to be gradual and based on broad political consensus. 
This underlines a need for broadening a public debate on key challenges in the 
existing model of fiscal federalism. The post-2007 election period may present 
a window of opportunity for addressing some of these issues, and it is important 
to inform policy  makers in  advance about  existing challenges  and available 
choices.
This paper intends to discuss some of these issues from the perspective of improvements in 
the quality of service delivery in core sectors, such as education and health. 
Insufficient Coordination in the Environment of Growing Inequality
Nigeria’s constitution provides for the participation of all three tiers of government 
in the delivery of core public services, such as education and health. This makes policy 
coordination an important pre-condition for effective and efficient service delivery. Several 
factors  can  be  adduced  as  justification  for  building  workable  inter-governmental 
coordination mechanisms.  As an illustration:
a. in the environment of shared responsibility for service delivery, non-coordinated 
interventions of different government levels create a risk for duplication of efforts 
and sub-optimal allocation of resources. 
b. when  there  is  an  agreement  on  common national  priorities  and  development 
objectives, such as those reflected in the National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy (NEEDS), it is sensible for all government levels to align 
their actions with such priorities and thus complement each other’s efforts. This is 
because, as in common complex social systems, there is significant potential for 
synergies between coordinated policies and actions.
c. finally, there is a case for the standard efficiency argument. Coordination could 
lead  to  better  overall  resource  utilization  through  economy of  scale,  quicker 
project  completion,  and  more  efficient  use  of  limited  resources  (such  as 
specialized technical expertise). It also helps to facilitate dissemination of best 
management practices.
What are the policy parameters that may be of special interest for governments that are 
interested  in  better  policy  coordination?  The  following  list,  while  far  from  being 
comprehensive, presents some important components:
i. level and structure of government spending in a particular sector.
ii. technical and quality standards of service delivery, such as curricular and 
educational standards, as well as immunization rules.
iii. expected levels of service delivery, such as the availability of health services 
(measured for instance through number of health personnel per 10,000 residents). 
iv. management practices (e.g. parameters used for cost-benefit analysis of proposed 
public projects).
v. reporting and accountability formats to ensure comparability of outcomes across 
different locations, which would support monitoring of progress towards 
achieving national policy priorities.
The issue of inter-governmental policy coordination has become increasingly important in 
Nigeria in recent times. This is primarily because since 1999 the Nigerian fiscal system has 
gone through rapid decentralization (Figure 1). Compared to the recent past, a much larger 
portion  of  public  funds  today  is  spent  on  the  basis  of  independent,  non-coordinated 
decisions  of  individual  state  and local  governments.  The  share  of  sub-national  budget 
spending in the consolidated budget doubled, increasing from 23 percent in 1999 to 46 
percent  in 2005.  Total  sub-national budget  expenditure in 2005 was almost  four times 
higher  in  real  terms  than  the  1999  level.  Moreover,  spending  by  local  government 
authorities (LGAs) has been growing even faster than state government spending, which 
means that sub-national budget systems have become increasingly decentralized.  
Figure 1. Real growth in government expenditure, 1999-2005, 1999=100%
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The main drivers of such rapid decentralization can be summarized as following (World 
Bank, 2007):
a. stricter enforcement of constitutional requirements; in particular, since the return 
to the civilian rule, the FGN has been much more disciplined in enforcing the 
existing revenue sharing rules than was the case in the 90s;
b. restoration of the derivation principle in the 1999 Constitution; 
c. Supreme Court decisions of 2002 that reduced the size of the first line deductions 
from the Federation Account (FA); and,
d. some adjustment in FA allocation shares since 2002 that favored sub-national 
governments.
Rapid expenditure decentralization has created both new opportunities and challenges for 
public  service  delivery  in  Nigeria.  Given  that  Nigerian  sub-national  governments  are 
mainly  responsible  for  financing  basic  public  services  such  as  primary  health  and 
education, decentralization creates the potential for further improvements in the financing 
of these priority sectors. At the same time, due to well-known capacity constraints at the 
sub-national level,  this expansion in financing creates a substantial risk of a decline in 
spending efficiency. It also increases the risk of misuse of funds due to slower pace of 
public  finance  management  (PFM) reforms  in  states.  So  far,  fiscal  decentralization  in 
Nigeria  has  not  been  accompanied  by  strengthened  accountability  of  sub-national 
governments for efficient utilization of resources they have now in their disposal.  This 
complicates progress in improving service delivery. 
The costs of non-coordinated policies are further aggravated by Nigeria’s rather 
rapid fiscal expansion and by the favorable oil prices of the world market. It is estimated 
that in 2005-07 total expenditures of the consolidated government in Nigeria (that includes 
spending of all government levels and extra-budgetary government accounts) in real terms 
will be growing at an average rate that exceeds 12% a year.
     1. Existing arrangements for inter-governmental policy coordination 
Technically,  Nigeria  has  the full  set  of  institutions  necessary to  support  policy 
coordination at both the macro and sector levels. Such existing structures are set up at four 
different administrative levels and these include:
a. National Council for Economic Planning that has state governors as members
b. National  Council  on  Development  Planning  with  a  membership  of  State 
Commissioners for Planning
c. Joint Planning Board, in which states are represented at the level of Permanent 
Secretaries from respective planning ministries
d. National  Sectoral  Councils  in  all  key  sectors,  representing  respective  state 
sectoral ministers and in which the National Planning Commission (NPC) is 
also represented
e. In  addition,  NPC  has  a  statutory  mandate  for  monitoring  state  economic 
performance and inter-governmental policy coordination.
Overall,  these existing arrangements for policy coordination between the federal 
and state  governments  remain  quite  weak.  While  there  have been regular  meetings  of 
various  councils  and  due  preparation  of  joint  plans,  to  large  extent,  the  prevailing 
coordination  effort  remains  at  the  level  of  coordination  of  plans,  but  not  of  actual 
implementation activities. As such, coordination has been often seen as a “paper exercise”, 
which does not have a real impact on either actual project selection or budget spending 
patterns of state governments. Effectiveness of national sectoral councils is low, and they 
are seen by many as just “talking shops” for participating officials.
The key indication of existing weaknesses in current coordination arrangements 
relates  to  the fact  that  Nigeria  does  not  have an established system for  production  of 
consolidated national reports on performance in individual sectors. At the moment, due to 
lack of the most basic information on performance of individual governments, nobody can 
tell,  for  example,  how much  money the  consolidated  Nigerian  government  spends  on 
primary education, what the structure of this spending is, and what is achieved with these 
expenditures.  A  lack  of  information  on  outcomes  and  outputs  undermines  the  whole 
concept of planning and coordination. Planning without monitoring and evaluation cannot 
be productive. If actual behavior is not monitored, participants will not take seriously the 
commitments they make in the course of the planning and coordination phase.
Insufficient  information  sharing  across  various  governments  represents  a 
fundamental weakness of the existing inter-governmental arrangements in Nigeria. Many 
state  governments  interpret  the  concept  of  state  autonomy in  a  way  that  complicates 
information  sharing  and  coordination  with  the  federal  government,  while  the  FGN 
currently has inadequate capacity and policy instruments to encourage states to engage in 
federal initiatives. This seriously complicates the development of modern evidence-based 
national  policies,  in  particular  in  the  Millennium Development  Goals  (MDGs)-related 
sectors.
The following list points to several specific examples of economic losses due to 
weak inter-governmental coordination:
i. Primary Health: Federal Government has been investing in construction of new 
primary health centers (PHCs), but states do not provide adequate financing for 
their operations. As a result, these facilities are heavily underutilized. At the 
same time, states spend an increasingly large portion of their health budgets on 
construction  and  operation  of  hospitals,  which  the  Constitution  defines  as 
federal responsibility.
ii. Water:  All  three  government  levels  have  been  engaged  in  uncoordinated 
activity to drill  new boreholes, and this frequently resulted in duplication of 
efforts. At the same time, there has not been much interest in the development 
of local water systems.
iii. Roads: The national road network has been developed in an uncoordinated way, 
with  too  much  political  influence  over  technical  decisions  on  priority  road 
projects. Moreover,  the lack of an agreed strategic vision resulted in under-
financing of maintenance of the existing roads,  their over-use,  and the poor 
quality of roads which drive up the costs of domestic transportation. 
     2. Issues of inter-government coordination in education 
Primary education represents an important and interesting example of the status of 
inter-government  coordination in  Nigeria.  Sectoral  analysis  reveals  nine out  of  12 key 
management functions in the sector are concurrent, i.e. expected to be delivered by more 
than one government level. Thus, the sector has enormous needs for effective coordination 
arrangements.  This  challenge  has  been  taken  quite  seriously  by  the  sector  leadership. 
According to a recent Department for International Development (DFID) report, based on 
cross-sectoral analysis, the existing arrangements in primary education currently represent 
the best example of vertical inter-government coordination (Improving Intergovernmental 
Collaboration…, 2005). 
Still, there is a major need for further improvement. In education, similar to other 
sectors,  more  attention  is  paid  to  coordination  of  plans  than  to  coordination  of  their 
execution.  Moreover,  the  coordination  effort  is  unevenly  distributed  across  various 
management functions, with some functions being more popular than others. As a result, on 
one side, there is a noticeable duplication of efforts in some areas (school construction, 
school  supervision)  while  insufficient  attention  to  others  (pre-school  education, 
analysis/evaluation of sector performance).
Another weakness of the current arrangements in education relates to lack of clarity 
in the accountability framework. It is unclear which government level is responsible for 
achieving key educational  outcomes.  There are  also  major  concerns  about  interactions 
between the Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC), a federal structure created to 
support primary education nationwide, and state ministries of education. There has been a 
common claim that instead of supporting state efforts to upgrade primary education, UBEC 
has  been  trying  to  run  the  primary  school  network  without  showing much interest  in 
building  state  capacity  to  manage  its  primary  education  (World  Bank,  2003).  This 
undermines longer-term sustainability of the recent reform efforts.
An important function of UBEC relates to the administration of federal matching grants 
to states in support of primary education. This specific grant scheme has been an important 
innovation  in  Nigeria’s  system of  intergovernmental  fiscal  arrangements.  The  analysis 
suggests, however, that the UBE grant program has serious challenges that led in recent 
years to under-utilization of available program funding. The reasons for such difficulties 
could be summarized as following:
a. insufficiently strong interest  of state governments to improve service delivery 
undermines their incentives to participate effectively in the program;
b. state  governors’  concern  of  becoming dependent  on  unpredictable  sources  of 
federal financing. Governors require greater assurance that a transfer program of 
this nature is protected from potential political manipulation;
c. the  way  UBEC  runs  its  business,  similar  to  many  other  federal  parastatals, 
antagonizes many state government officials.  There is insufficient consultation, 
reflection of local priorities in project selection, and no real desire to engage local 
officials in implementation and monitoring;
d. insufficient  availability  of  information  on  actual  performance  of  the  UBE 
program, which limits opportunities for its reform.
Moreover, there is a sign of inadequate policy coordination even among federal entities 
operating in the education sector, such as the Federal Ministry of Education on one side, 
and  UBEC  and  Education  Trust  Fund  (ETF)  on  the  other.  An  example  is  the  latest 
government strategy document in the sector, the 2007-9 Education MTSS, which did not 
cover funding administered by the UBEC or ETF. These organizations continue to claim 
their policy independence from the Federal Government.
Finally,  an  additional  area  where  there  is  clear  need  for  strengthening  inter-
governmental coordination in education relates to the framework for resource allocation in 
the sector. The World Bank (2003) points to an absence of transparent rules for resource 
allocation  based  on  clear  national  guidelines  and  recommended  norms  of  per  student 
spending, differentiated by type of educational facility. Lack of such rules leads to major 
horizontal  expenditure  inequalities  within  the  education  system,  at  the  level  of  both 
individual  schools  and states.  Within  the current  system,  there  is  no  clear  strategy  to 
address horizontal inequalities in education financing.
     3. Summary: Institutional challenges in the area of inter-government coordination
Overall,  the  institutional  challenges  for  more  efficient  inter-government 
coordination can be summarized as following:
a) federal government entities do not have capacity and an effective mandate to 
monitor  and  coordinate  state  performance.  It  does  not  have  practical 
instruments at its disposal to influence states’ project and spending choices.
b) states’ leaders perceive themselves as “independent to the extreme”, with rather 
weak interest in information sharing and participation in joint projects. Broad 
powers  guaranteed  to  states  by  the  Constitution  in  policy  making  and 
expenditure allocation policy are seen as a mandate for non-cooperation. This is 
aggravated by generally weak accountability of sub-national governments. 
c) there is a critical lack of information on governments’ performance. However, 
without adequate information, it is impossible to design and operate an efficient 
coordination  mechanism.  Three  types  of  informational  problems  should  be 
highlighted in this context:
i) Critical  information is  not  produced on a regular basis. It  is  worth 
noting that this challenge is broadly recognized by the government, and 
major effort has been underway to build capacity of the National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS). Major recent achievements include the completion 
of the population census and national poverty survey.  However,  less 
progress has been made so far to improve quality and availability of 
information on expenditure patterns and quality of service delivery.
ii) Information is available, but it  is of poor quality and does not meet  
recognized international standards. For instance, Nigeria’s budget data 
are  largely  incomparable  with those from other countries  because of 
fundamental weaknesses in the existing budget classification. 
iii) Information is produced, but not made publicly available. In part, due to 
the legacy of  military  rule,  there  is  considerable  reluctance to  share 
information on government performance. As an illustration, the reports 
of  Auditors-General  are  commonly seen  to  be “too  sensitive”  to  be 
made publicly available. The recently prepared Freedom of Information 
Bill is expected to improve the situation in this area.
Insufficient availability of good social and fiscal information has major implications for 
government  policy.  It  greatly  undermines  efficiency  of  policymaking  in  general  by 
isolating  policy  deliberation  from  realities  on  the  ground.  It  has  particularly  grave 
implications  for  a  design  of  the  system  of  inter-government  fiscal  arrangements. 
International  experience  suggests  that  quality  information  is  a  key  pre-condition  for 
establishing a transparent and mutually acceptable system of sharing a common pool of 
fiscal resources across different government levels.
Moreover,  lack  of  comparative  information  on state  performance  greatly  limits 
inter-state competitive pressures to improve service delivery. In Nigeria, state authorities 
do not face much of competitive pressure to perform, and this represents under-utilization 
of a major potential advantage of federal system -- competitive federalism.
     4. Risk of growing fiscal inequality
The benefits of recent fiscal decentralization have been distributed rather unevenly 
across  sub-national  governments.  This  is  because,  in  keeping  with  the  constitutional 
requirements, about a third of all allocations from the Federation Account to states reflects 
derivation  oil  payments,  which  are  heavily  concentrated.  The  four  main  oil-producing 
states (Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, and Akwa Ibom) jointly received about 90 percent of all 
derivation oil payments, or about N265 billion (US$2 billion) in 2005. The fact that despite 
all  these additional revenues, the oil producing states of Nigeria did not perform much 
better than the rest of the country in terms of service delivery and human development 
indicators suggests that major efficiency gains still remain available through improvements 
in the expenditure management and accountability systems of these states. 
The existing level of inequality in the Nigeria’s fiscal system is rather high and has 
been growing recently due to high oil prices. Table 1 presents some estimates of cross-state 
inequality in the distribution of funds collected by the federal government, (i.e. what is 
usually called “federal transfers” in other federal systems). Since such transfers form about 
90% of  all  revenues  in  most  states,  these  inequalities  reflect  rather  accurately  overall 
inequality in per capita budget expenditures at the state level.
Table 1. Cross-state variation in total statutory allocation per capita, 
(Naira thousand, a sum of allocations from the Federation Account and VAT)
2001 2005
Average allocation per capita 3.11 8.28
Coeff. of variation 62.4% 105.3%
Max/Min ratio 8.80 17.38
Share of 4 oil states in total 25.5% 34.0%
Source: CBN, Population Census
Note: Based on the 2006 population data as reported by the National Population Commission.
As Table 1 shows, the difference in per capita transfers between the wealthiest and poorest 
states increased from about 9 times in 2001 to more than 17 times in 2005. While four 
richest states, which collectively host only about 11% of Nigerian population, received a 
quarter of all transfers in 2001, their share increased to more than a third in 2005.  Figure 2 
presents the full scale of variation in per capita transfers in 2005.
Figure 2. Variation in the level of per capita transfers, 2005, 
(N thousand, a sum of federation account allocations and VAT)
Note: The dark column indicates a national average level of per capita allocation.
The reasons for such a high level of inequality are quite clear. It is because the existing 
formula  for  horizontal  allocation  of  revenues  pays  insufficient  attention  to  equity 
considerations. The following features of the existing federal allocation arrangements are 
important to mention in this context:
a. 54% of  federation  account  funds  are  distributed  equally  across  states,  which 
works against more populous states
b. huge derivation premium, as discussed above, which primarily benefit only four 
states
c. no attention to local revenue capacity of individual states
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d. small share (2.5%) of funds is distributed proportionally to local revenue effort, 
which usually works as a penalty on poor states that have less opportunities to 
increase their revenue collections
Overall, rapid expenditure decentralization poses a risk of growing inequality across the 
states, especially with respect to the quality and availability of social services. Moreover, as 
international experience suggests, high level of horizontal inequality may bring additional 
political risks. To be able to achieve its national development targets, in particular with 
respect to MDGs, the federal government will need to develop its capacity for monitoring 
cross-state differences in access to core social services and at some point expand federal 
equalization  programs to  provide  additional  opportunities  to  citizens  in  less  developed 
states. 
Reform Directions to Strengthen Inter-Governmental Policy Coordination
Our analysis so far suggests that without better inter-governmental coordination it 
would be difficult for Nigeria to make sustainable progress in the attainment of the MDGs. 
This is primarily because, while states and local governments have major responsibilities 
for MDG-related sectors,  without closer cooperation with the federal  government,  they 
would not be able to secure adequate funding and necessary improvements in the quality of 
service delivery. Some states are just too poor and do not have enough resources to provide 
adequate funding for MDG-related activities due to the inequality in the existing system of 
resource distribution. At the same time, many states, including those that have a better 
funding base, do not use their resources in line with national priorities, in particular in such 
areas as primary education, health, and rural development. Moreover, overall nationwide 
progress is  affected by the loss of efficiency due to duplication of efforts  by different 
governments.
To  address  these  challenges,  Nigeria’s  inter-governmental  arrangements  may 
require a thorough review and comprehensive reform in line with the international best 
practices and Nigeria’s own experiences. So far, there has been considerable imbalance in 
discussions  on  what  is  necessary  to  make  Nigeria’s  fiscal  federalism  more  effective. 
Discussions focus on issues of resource control and on arguments in favor of further re-
distribution  of  resources  from  the  federal  to  state  governments  rather  than  on  better 
utilization of available resources. Similarly, there is surprisingly little interest in the equity 
dimension of the resource control problem. 
1. New more Cooperative Models of Service Delivery
There  is  a  need  to  build  a  broader  consensus  around  the  idea  that  a  new,  more 
cooperative model of inter-governmental relations is necessary to ensure better utilization 
of available resources. Such a model should include the following key elements:
a) jointly developed policies in the sectors of recurrent responsibility;
b) real  coordination  in  implementation,  including  project  selection  and  spending 
levels;
c) joint monitoring and evaluation; 
d) disclosure of results;
e) encouragement of competition in service delivery.
The new model would also suggest that the FGN should gradually withdraw from 
the actual delivery of services and instead play a more active role in setting national policy, 
in  co-financing  of  service  delivery  undertaken  by  lower  government  levels,  and  in 
monitoring and evaluation of actual performance.
     2. Two directions for reform
To  ensure  progress  towards  a  new  model,  reforms  should  be  undertaken 
simultaneously  in  two  inter-related  directions:  (i)  inter-governmental  finance,  and  (ii) 
improved institutional framework.
With  respect  to  inter-governmental  finance,  the  existing  system of  sharing  the 
common pool of funds may need careful and gradual transformation to provide for (i) more 
equalization of the system, and (ii) introduction of new financing mechanisms, such as 
federal  matching,  conditional,  and specific  grants to states.  The latter  are necessary to 
encourage states to align their interests in line with national priorities,  influence states’ 
choices, and strengthen their accountability for spending public money.
With respect to the institutional framework, the immediate priority is to strengthen 
the effectiveness of existing coordinating institutions, based on their functional review. The 
recent report sponsored by the DFID (Improving Intergovernmental Collaboration…, 2005) 
could be used as a  starting point in this work. A possible strategy could be based on (i) 
consolidating/rationalizing the existing set  of institutions, and (ii) providing the NPC with a 
bigger and clearly defined mandate for inter-governmental policy coordination. The latter may 
include responsibility for design and execution of different federal grant schemes, monitoring 
and  evaluation  of  performance  of  such  schemes,  support  for  sector-specific  coordination 
structures, as well as coordination of various federal efforts to accelerate state level reforms 
linked to state capacity building and dissemination of best local practices and others. The NPC 
should also lead the work on developing a set of requirements for effective implementation of 
joint  expenditure  programs,  including  administrative,  legal,  financial  and  reporting 
requirements.
There is also a need for a critical review of governments’ expenditure mandates 
under the current arrangements. Its purpose would be the development of options for their 
gradual adjustment in light of international experience. As an illustration,  in the health 
sector, the analysis suggests a need for a larger role of the federal government in primary 
health, health insurance, and disease prevention.
Another priority direction for institutional strengthening relates to improvements in 
the accountability framework, based on better information on how public money are used 
and data on quality of service delivery. As emphasized by Paul Collier (2006), a preferable 
institutional arrangement in ethically diverse societies with resource rents, such as Nigeria, 
is  a  democracy  with  decentralized  public  spending  and  unusually  strong  checks  and 
balances.  So  far,  Nigeria  has  been  doing  pretty  well  with  respect  to  expenditure 
decentralization,  but  accountability  of  government  officials  remains  generally  weak, 
despite the reform efforts of the last few years.
Overall,  the transition to the new model of inter-governmental  arrangements would 
require strong federal agencies capable of performing inter alia the following functions:
a. participatory development of sectoral strategies, establishment of clear regulatory 
framework for service delivery
b. establishment of national targets for service delivery
c. costing national strategies and their main components
d. drafting  model  state-level  laws  and  regulations  (where  appropriate)  and 
encourage states to adopt them (such as disclosure,  reporting,  and monitoring 
rules) 
e. designing and delivery of federal technical assistance programs for states, helping 
states to develop their own efficient strategies and implementation arrangements
f. monitoring  of  progress  in  the key  sectors,  including  support  for  independent 
evaluation of state performance and spending of FA allocations in the context of 
SEEDS benchmarking
A separate important federal function within the new model, which would be relatively 
new for Nigeria, relates to federal support to states with implementation of their sectoral 
reforms. International experience suggests that such support could be the most effective if 
it is aimed at providing  a mix of federal incentives to states, including financial assistance 
(grants),  political  support,  and  technical  assistance.  To  consolidate  federal  reform-related 
assistance to sub-national governments, several countries use a State Reform Assistance Fund 
mechanism. 
     3. International Perspective on Reforms in Federal Transfers
Inter-governmental  finance  systems  worldwide  show  several  stable  common 
patterns, which could be easily explained on the basis of efficiency considerations. One of 
such patterns is significant asymmetry in expenditure and revenue-rising responsibilities. 
This results in a gap between relatively high centralization in revenue collection and much 
more decentralized pattern of public spending (Vigneault, 2007). Such asymmetry explains 
a need to design an efficient system of federal transfers that would return a portion of 
centrally collected revenues back to lower levels of the government to help them finance 
their expenditure mandates. 
Another  common  pattern  in  inter-governmental  finance  is  that  expenditure 
responsibilities are pretty similar worldwide. States (sub-national governments) are usually 
responsible  for the provision  of  key public  services,  including basic  health,  education, 
social  protection,  roads,  etc.  And  many  of  such  state  responsibilities,  as  assigned  by 
national  constitutions,  are  such  that  they  are  critical  for  achieving  core  national 
development objectives. This implies that the federal government has considerable interest 
in the manner in which the regions exercise their legislative responsibilities (Broadway, 
2007). That is, the federal government is interested in the level of states’ service delivery 
and  quality  of  delivered  services.  It  is  expected  to  monitor  sufficiency  of  resources 
allocated to services of national importance and try to influence state expenditure choices.
In addition to the need to ensure the achievement of national/common development 
objectives,  the  main  reasons  for  such  an  “interventionist”  position  of  the  federal 
government include:
a) Equity argument: the federal government has responsibility for equalizing the 
level  of  public  service  delivery  across  locations  that  have  equal  levels  of 
taxation, and more generally equalize local opportunities for growth.
b) Efficiency argument: that relates to a spillover effect of public services, and 
respectively  to  possible  under-supply  of  services  produced  on  the  basis  of 
decentralized decisions.
Within this framework, it is broadly acknowledged that development and implementation 
of  national  poverty  alleviation  programs  should  be  a  joint  responsibility  of  different 
government levels. The federal government is supposed to provide most of the funding and 
set  up general  rules,  while  day-to-day implementation should be done by sub-national 
governments (Rao, 2002b).
Respectively, federal grants to states are seen as a common instrument to improve 
efficiency of inter-governmental cooperation.  They are used by federal  governments to 
influence  states’  resource  allocation  and encourage  them to  improve  financing  of  key 
services  in  line  with  national  priorities.  They  do  not  mean  a  subordination  of  one 
government  level  to  another,  while  instead  aim at  aligning interests  and strengthening 
government cooperation. Sato (2007) calls inter-governmental transfers “glue for national 
unity”.  In  particular,  programs  of  specific  grants,  linked  to  particular  sectoral 
programs/services, if  properly set up, could provide for both budget autonomy of grant 
recipients and securing that additional funding is concentrated in key policy areas.
The main lessons from international experience on design of grant schemes could be 
summarized as following (Shah, 2007):
i. keep it simple
ii. aim at a single objective in each grant program
iii. undertake periodic review of program relevance
iv. build national consensus on objectives and design of grant programs
v. combine (i) block grants to equalize fiscal capacity, using explicit standard of 
revenue  potential  with  (ii)  specific  program-linked  grants  to  equalize 
differences in needs
vi. avoid multi-factor formulas for fiscal equalization
vii. make  grants  output  (not  input)  oriented  at  achieving  minimum  national 
standards in access to public services
In addition, to become sustainable, grant mechanisms need to be institutionalized and based 
on a clear  legislative framework to ensure that  it  is  implemented in  a transparent  and 
predictable way, and the federal government cannot manipulate the system in support of its 
own political agenda.
Recent Policy Developments in Nigeria
In  Nigeria,  there  has  been  a  gradual  building  of  consensus  that  the  federal 
government should start the withdrawal from the actual delivery of services and play a 
more active role in setting national policy, financing of priority services and monitoring. 
While there is no developed blue print to operationalize this strategy, the government has 
accumulated important practical experience under the Universal Basic Education (UBE) 
scheme. Further, as part of the 2007 budget cycle, the FGN has designed a new conditional 
transfer scheme.
In  particular,  as  part  of  2007  federal  budget,  the  following  new federal  grant 
schemes were approved and should be seen as pilots, which if successful could be scaled 
up later:
a) Conditional  grants  (N20  bn): to  support  eligible  state  projects  in  primary 
health, rural electrification, and rural water supply and sanitation based on the 
approved federal guidelines
b) Safety Net Schemes (N10 bn): specific grants to be channeled to communities 
across  the  states  for  financing  pre-selected  poverty  reduction  interventions 
through  National  Poverty  Eradication  Programme  (NAPEP)  and  SME 
Development Agency (SMEDAN)
In  the  area  of  federal  monitoring,  the  federal  government  has  accumulated 
important  experience  in  2005-06  through  undertaking  the  first  SEEDS  benchmarking 
exercise. The FGN has also made efforts recently to improve its capacity to monitor state 
expenditure patterns, but these efforts are constrained by the lack of constitutional authority 
to  request  proper  budget  reporting  and disclosure  by  states.  It  is  expected  that,  when 
adopted,  the  Fiscal  Responsibility  Law  would  create  a  better  framework  for  fiscal 
disclosure  and  accountability,  as  well  as  for  federal  monitoring  of  sub-national  fiscal 
performance. 
Another major promising recent development in the area of policy coordination 
relates to the preparation of Medium Term Sector Strategies (MTSS) during the last two 
budget cycles, i.e. in the course of preparation of 2006 and 2007 annual budgets. Several 
MTSS documents made a serious emphasis  on strengthening inter-governmental  policy 
coordination in respective sectors. For instance, in health, the federal ministry is committed 
inter alia to pursue its Goal 1 - to improve governance in the sector, including policy 
formulation, regulation, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation. In particular, the FGN 
has been working to secure a passage of the National Health Bill, which is supposed to 
strengthen the regulation of the national health system by establishing the standards of 
service delivery, clarify responsibilities at each level of the government, and set up national 
health information systems.
Other federal initiatives for 2007-09 to promote inter-governmental coordination in 
the health sector, as reflected in the MTSS, include the following:
a. construction of national health accounts,
b. providing technical assistance to states and LGAs,
c. strengthening federal monitoring of health sector performance, including through a) 
the establishment of countrywide monitoring and evaluation of hospital services, 
and b) undertaking a regular survey of health workers at the LGA level,
d. supporting activities of the National Council on Health.
Relevant International Experience of Using Federal Fiscal
Transfers to States
There is a great deal of international experience in the creative use of federal grant 
schemes to facilitate national development through better inter-governmental cooperation. 
This section is focused on examples from India and Russia, (two large federations) which 
still have major unresolved problems in their models of federalism, but which have made 
considerable gradual progress in this area. Box 1 below presents relevant examples from a 
number of other, both developed and developing countries.
India has used 3 main complimentary channels to provide federal transfers to states 
(Rao, 2002a; McCarten, 2003):
a. Finance Commission (which distributes about 60% of all federal financial support 
to  states)  provides  unconditional  block  grants,  which  are  formula  based,  and 
mostly aimed at achieving equalization objectives. Distribution of these grants is 
linked to the size of state population and local incidence of poverty. Individual 
states’ funding shares are linked to the local tax potential, but not to actual tax 
collection.
b. Planning Commission (22% of  all  transfers)  is  responsible  for  formula-based 
support  to  implement  state  development  plans  provided  as  a  combination  of 
grants  and  soft  loans  to  states  in  proportion  30:70.  There  is  a  soft  policy 
conditionality attached to this funding in the form of federal certification of state 
development plans.
c. Sectoral  schemes administered  by  sectoral  ministries  (18% of  all  transfers): 
federal  co-financing  of  state  programs  (in  proportion  of  50-80%  of  overall 
program budget) to improve provision of public services with significant spillover 
effect  and  facilitate  achievement  of  national  goals,  including  in  the  area  of 
primary education expenses,  child nutrition,  family planning,  self-employment 
support. India has more than 180 of such individual programs, several of which 
show strong populist flavor. 
Overall,  about  50% of all  federally  collected taxes in  India is  shared back with states 
though federal transfer programs. The total amount of resources involved exceeds 7% of 
GDP.
Box 1. International experience with the grant schemes: selected examples
Indonesia operated  (before  2001)  a  highly  successful  program  of  federal  support  to  primary  schools 
managed by local governments (LGs). The program included two components: a) operating grant to LGs 
based on school age population, and b) capital grants for school construction to communities that do not 
meet national standard of access.
South Africa adopted a Municipal Finance  Management Act that  introduced a Treasury-managed grant 
system  for  municipalities  to  encourage  an  upgrade  in  municipal  budget  management  practices.  This 
represents an example of “money for reforms” type of scheme.
Tanzania operates  a  Local  Government  Capital  Development  Grant  (LGCDG)  system  of  allocating 
performance  based  grants  for  local  development.  Those  municipalities  that  fail  to  meet  performance 
requirements are eligible for smaller grants for local capacity building. 
In 1976, the USA operated 412 different federal specific grant programs with the overall budget of $170bn 
a year.
Since 1996, Germany has allocated 18% of federally collected oil product excises to states to finance local 
investment projects in public transportation.
Russia’s example is interesting from the perspective of relatively rapid progress 
made by the country in reforming its fiscal federalism arrangements. It took Russia about a 
decade to introduce rather a modern system of federal  transfers basically from scratch 
(Figure  3).  Most  federal  funding  currently  distributed  in  Russia  to  sub-national 
governments is formula-based, quite transparent and predictable. Significant attention is 
paid to the equity dimension of federal funding, while local differences in revenue potential 
are explicitly taken into account. Since 2000, Russia has introduced specific grant schemes 
to  compensate  regional  governments  for  administering  and  financing  federal 
responsibilities in the area of social protection (World Bank, 2004).
In 1998 Russia piloted an innovative federal grant scheme called the “Fund for 
Regional Fiscal Reforms”, a special grant window to encourage fiscal reforms in line with 
the federal priorities. To qualify, regions had to meet specific policy targets in the PFM 
area,  such  as  reduction  in  debts  and  deficits,  establishment  of  regional  treasury, 
improvement  in  cost  recovery  in  the  utility  sector,  etc.  One  could  see  this  policy 
conditionality as an IMF-type of reform program run by the Federal Ministry of Finance 
for regions that are interested in policy adjustment.
The program is administered by the designated Department in the Federal Ministry 
of  Finance,  which  also  has  responsibilities  for  federal  monitoring  of  regional  fiscal 
performance,  technical  support  to  sub-national  governments,  and  dissemination  of 
regional-best  practice.  It  is  worth noting that the overall  size of the program has been 
relatively small (participating regions have been awarded grants in the range of $10mn per 
region). However, many reform-minded governments found participation in the program 
beneficial because of its attractive combination of cash and non-cash benefits.
Figure 3. The structure of the federal transfer system
Source: World Bank (2004)
Lessons for Nigeria from recent Russian experience with fiscal federalism reforms 
could be summarized as following:
a) fiscal federalism reform is a long term process, which could not be completed 
in 1-2 years,
b) it is extremely politically sensitive, and may need a popular central government 
to facilitate a consensus building across different government levels,
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c) the environment of strong economic recovery and broadly shared growth is very 
conducive  to  reduce  states’  opposition  to  reforms  and  facilitate  consensus 
building,
d) improvements  in  social  and  fiscal  statistics  are  important  to  illustrate 
deficiencies of the pre-reform situation (e.g. inequalities) and properly estimate 
potential reform impact (e.g. winners and losers of the proposed change)
e) clarification  of  expenditure/revenue  mandates  and  improvements  in 
equalization  formula  is  not  enough  to  improve  efficiency  in  the 
intergovernmental  finance  system.  To  encourage  adjustment  in  states’ 
performances,  these  must  be  complimented  by  adequate  fiscal  rules  and 
intergovernmental policy coordination mechanisms.
 Nigeria: Is there a need for some more radical changes in the system of inter-
governmental transfers?
Given  the  above analysis,  this  paper  suggests  the  following priority  directions  for 
reforming inter-governmental financing arrangements in Nigeria:
a. more attention to the equity dimension of revenue sharing
b. strengthening government accountability for utilization of public money in general, 
and  for  use  of  a  common  pool  of  funds  such  as  the  Federation  Account  in 
particular, and
c. introduction of specific grant schemes directly linked to expansion of sub-national 
government financing in key sectors
With regard to these innovations, in particular specific grant schemes, the natural question 
then is:  “what  should be a  source of  their  funding?” In this  respect,  it  may be worth 
considering some relatively radical changes to the existing revenue sharing arrangements, 
such as the following:
a. conversion  of  allocations  from the  existing  VAT account  into  a  specific  grant 
scheme, tied to spending on primary health: all sub-national governments would 
continue to receive the same shares of the common VAT pool, but they would 
agree  to  channel  those  proceeds  to  primary  health  within  the  agreed  national 
framework.
b. use of off-shore oil revenues, which are not produced at the territory of any state, 
for  a  new  fiscal  equalization  scheme,  (i.e.  distribute  this  money  across  states 
differently than on-shore oil revenues). Should off-shore oil revenues be freed from 
the derivation principle to improve general equity of fiscal allocations to states?
c. agreement that future revenues from natural gas production be distributed across 
government levels differently from the existing arrangements with respect to oil 
revenues in order to focus these funds more directly on improvements in service 
delivery in key sectors, such as education and health.
If there is an appetite for these type of reforms, Nigeria could start with a pilot program to 
test block grant arrangements tied to the implementation of a particular national program of 
primary  importance  by  sub-national  governments,  such  as  child  immunization.  The 
underlying rationale for this innovation could be (a) the need to encourage a nationwide 
increase in sub-national spending in the selected area, and (b) potential efficiency gains 
from better coordination across governments. This could be viewed as a federal  policy 
aimed at accelerating the achievement of core MDGs and the implementation of SEEDS in 
key sectors. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
The  analysis  in  this  paper  suggests  the  following  main  directions  for  reforms  to 
strengthen inter-governmental coordination:
a) shift from joint service delivery towards co-financing, state/local delivery, and joint 
monitoring,
b) more attention to equalization dimension of federalism,
c) expansion in specific grant schemes focused on key MDG areas,
d) strengthening  accountability  arrangements  for  how  public  money  is  spent, 
especially at state level,
e) strengthening  capacity  of  institutions  responsible  for  inter-governmental  policy 
coordination with NPC becoming a central player,
f) facilitating inter-state competition on the basis of quality of service delivery.
Development partners could support Nigeria’s efforts in this area by:
i. helping  the  FGN  to  carry  out  unbiased  evaluation/monitoring  of  state 
performance
ii. support FGN efforts to accelerate capacity building in states
iii. concentrate donors’ support in reform-minded states, in particular states that are 
eager to cooperate with the federal government in service delivery
iv. providing advice  on the  best  international  practice  in  organization  of  inter-
governmental fiscal relations
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